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THE PUBLIC REFERENDUM AND MINORITY
GROUP LEGISLATION: POSTSCRIPT
TO REITMAN v. MULKEY
James J. Seeleyt
Among the most troublesome conceptual problems emerging
from the Supreme Court during the sixties are the issues first framed
in the often praised or condemned, but little understood, opinion in
Reitman v. Mulkey.' Since the 1967 holding in Reitman that repeal
of open housing legislation violated the fourteenth amendment, a
number of cases presenting similar or related issues have arisen in the
lower federal courts. The factual contexts from which these cases
evolved present useful vehicles for exploring the development of Reit-
man to its logical extreme and positing additional situations that would
evoke its equal protection doctrines. The recent Supreme Court
decision in Hunter v. Erickson,2 which struck down another attempted
open housing repeal on substantially different grounds, provides an
important addendum against which the Reitman theory must be
evaluated anew. The involvement of the public referendum in Reit-
man and subsequent cases raises serious though perhaps only academic
questions under the republican form of government guarantee and
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University. LL.B. 1969, Duke University.
1 587 U.S. 369 (1967). For the suggestion that Reitman stands for the proposition
that states have an affirmative duty to enact fair housing laws to avoid involvement by
acquiescence in state action violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, see Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARv. L. RFv. 69 (1967), and Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39 [hereinafter cited as Karst & Horo-
witz].
2 393 U.s. 385 (1969).
3 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. A brief history of the Supreme Court's refusal to examine
the republican form of government guarantee because of its political nature is con-
tained in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-26 (1962).
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the equal protection clause concerning the submission of pro-minority
group legislation to the body politic for ultimate ratification. This
article will attempt to evaluate the continuing utility of Reitman v.
Mulkey and its attendant theories in light of post-Reitman develop-
ments.
I
TIE Reitman OPINION
The logical point of departure is necessarily a brief analysis of
Reitman itself.4 Proposition 14 amended the California constitution
to provide:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall
deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any per-
son, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of
his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses. 5
The amendment was placed on the ballot for referendum by petition
of the electorate and passed by almost a two to one margin.6 The open
housing issue had been the subject of considerable public debate and
the campaign that surrounded the introduction and approval of Prop-
osition 14 was clearly directed toward repeal of the then recently
enacted California open housing laws, 7 the Rumford 8 and Unruh9
Acts. Reitman arose after passage of the constitutional amendment
4 For a detailed, insightful, and extensive analysis of Reitman, see Karst & Horo-
witz. See also Horowitz & Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases: Justice in Search of
a Justification, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 37 (1966); Miller, Mulkey v. Reitman: A Brave but
Futile Gesture?, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 51 (1966); Williams, Mulkey v. Reitman and State
Action, 14 U.C.LA.L. REv. 26 (1966); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Proposition 14:
An Extension of Prohibited "State Action," 19 STAN. L. REv. 232 (1966); 33 BRoorLN
L. REv. 125 (1966); 2 CAL. WFs. L. REV. 109 (1966); 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 201 (1966-67);
55 GEO. L.J. 377 (1966); 65 MICH. L. REv. 777 (1967); 6 SANrA CLARA LAw. 241 (1966); 42
WA H. L. RFv. 285 (1966); 18 W. REs. L. R V. 328 (1966).
G CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964).
6 The exact vote was 4,526,460 to 2,395,747. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 545,
413 P.2d 825, 836, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 892 (1966).
7 See Karst & Horowitz 41.
8 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-44 (West 1967).
9 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1970). This Act proscribed racial discrimina-
tion by business establishments, but had been interpreted by the California Supreme
Court to include all businesses selling or leasing residential housing (Burks v. Poppy
Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962) (sale of housing); Lee
v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962) (rental of housing)),
thereby becoming essentially another open housing statute.
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when the plaintiffs sought, under the Unruh Act, to enjoin a refusal
to rent to them on the basis of race. They were, of course, faced with
the argument that use of the Unruh Act was precluded by Proposition
14. The California Supreme Court upheld the application of the Unruh
Act to open housing by reasoning that the Act had survived the at-
tempted repeal because Proposition 14 was violative of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and was therefore void.10
The California court looked to both the immediate objective and the
ultimate effect" of Proposition 14 in light of its historical background
and the social milieu surrounding its adoption. It found the intent
to be the facilitation of discrimination through repeal of existing
open housing legislation and the effect to be the placing of state author-
ization behind private discrimination, thus involving the state in
activity encouraging discrimination.'2
Justice White, writing for the United States Supreme Court,
found "no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments
should be overturned,"' 8 but refrained from wholesale adoption of
the California court's opinion. Considerable deference was paid to the
"fact finding" concerning the design and intent behind Proposition
14 and its ultimate impact of encouraging discrimination in the total
social milieu. The Court was careful to point out that it did not read
the California opinion as indicating that mere repeal of open housing
legislation violated the fourteenth amendment.14 Clearly, repeal plus
something more was required, 5 and that "something more" was to
become a critical factor in post-Reitman opinions.
10 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
11 Id. at 533-34, 413 P.2d at 828, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
12 Id. at 541-43, 413 P.2d at 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The court reasoned, somewhat
problematically, that the state had acted affirmatively to change its laws from a situation
where discrimination was legally proscribed to one wherein it was "encouraged." Critics
of the decision, however, who saw it as standing for the proposition that civil rights leg-
islation once passed could not be repealed, read "encouraged" as "permitted." In fair-
ness, the language of the amendment on its face more readily lends itself to that
interpretation. The critical position, however, overlooks the consideration given by the
court to the practical effect of the amendment within the social milieu. Judicial fact
finding in support of this conclusion was unfortunately sketchy.
13 887 U.S. at 881.
14 Id. at 876.
15 The requirement that something more than mere repeal be present satisfies two
logical objections raised by the critics: (1) that if there was no constitutional violation
in failing to have an open housing statute on the books, there could be none in return-
ing the situation to the status quo; (2) that a constitutional impediment upon the re-
peal of any law once passed would constitute an intolerable stifling of the developing
legislative process and would serve as a strong argument against the passage of any
law that supposedly could not later be repealed.
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The Court found its "something more" in Reitman in the fol-
lowing facts: (1) Proposition 14 by intent and effect expressly author-
ized discrimination in the purchase or sale of real property; (2) as
a constitutional amendment, Proposition 14 immunized housing dis-
crimination from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation; and (3)
repeal itself had the practical effect of encouraging discrimination.16
State encouragement of private discrimination by the various means
mentioned here was the ostensible basis for the decision)'
The immunization of discrimination from legislative, executive,
or judicial regulation raises an additional equal protection considera-
tion not clearly elucidated in the opinion. The argument that may
be developed runs along traditional equal protection lines: the state
may not, without a rational reason closely related to a valid state in-
terest, treat one group of persons differently from another group. In
context, the argument is that the state cannot subject persons inter-
ested in passage of laws regulating real property to any greater legis-
lative burden, such as the overcoming of a constitutional amendment,
than that to which others interested in other types of legislation are
subjected. This "increased legislative burden" argument' s has been
recognized as a basis underlying the Reitman opinion;19 however,
actual reliance upon it by the Court is a speculative point at best.
II
THE PosT-Reitman CASES: ENCOURAGEMENT OF
DISCRIMINATION BY REFERENDA
Sensitivity to the "something more" in Reitman is particularly
useful in understanding the lower federal court opinions that have
purported to follow its reasoning. The first of these, Otey v. Common
Council,20 involved immunization and authorization without the
repeal aspects present in Reitman. Otey arose in a period when serious
16 Points one and three probably overlap, since, at least in the California context,
it is difficult to conceive of how an authorization to discriminate could fail to be also
an encouragement.
17 387 US. at 380-81.
18 The increased burden idea appeared in the Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 26-30, and later became a basis for the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 585 (1969).
19 See Karst & Horowitz 50-51.
20 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968). This case is noted in 82 HARV. L. REV. 1550
(1969) and 1969 Wis. L. Riwy. 327.
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racial disturbances threatened the city of Milwaukee. 21 A number
of open housing ordinances had been proferred, but none had received
sufficient support for passage. Against this factual backdrop, the fol-
lowing resolution was filed for approval by the city council or submis-
sion to the electorate: 22
BE IT RESOLVED:
That the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee SHALL
NOT enact any ordinance which in any manner restricts the right
of owners of real estate to sell, lease or rent private property.2 3
The city council, unwilling to enact the provision on its own, decided
to submit the issue to the voters. At this juncture, suit was filed in
the federal district court to enjoin the submission of the resolution
to a referendum on the ground that the provision, if passed, would deny
plaintiffs equal protection of the law.
The absence of one of the prime elements of Reitman's "encour-
agement"-repeal of existing legislation-was no impediment to the
district court's use of the same rationale. Although the constitutionality
of the proposed law was not squarely before the court since it had not
yet been passed, that question was the major subject of inquiry. Again,
the law's immediate objective, ultimate impact, and historical context
were deemed highly important. The objective identified was the pre-
vention of open housing legislation, and the result to be accomplished
was the securing of a "right" to discriminate. The court concluded
21 281 F. Supp. at 270-72.
22Wisconsin provides for the popular initiation of municipal legislation:
(1) A number of electors equal to at least 15%o of the votes cast for governor
at the last general election in their city may sign and file a petition with the
city clerk requesting that an attached proposed ordinance or resolution, with-
out alteration, either be adopted by the common council or referred to a vote
of the electors. ...
(4) The common council shall, without alteration, either pass the ordinance
or resolution within 50 days following the date of the clerk's final certificate, or
submit it to the electors at the next election ....
(8) City ordinances or resolutions adopted under this section shall not be
subject to the veto power of the mayor and shall not be repealed or amended
within 2 years of adoption except by a vote of the electors. The common council
may submit a proposition to repeal or amend the ordinance or resolution at
any election.
WIS. STAT. § 9.20 (1967).
23 Quoted in 281 F. Supp. at 267.
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that the resolution, if enacted, would "unquestionably encourage" 24
discrimination, and that it therefore was violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The increased burden affixed to the passage of open
housing laws was not assessed under the equal protection clause, al-
though the factual context provided grounds for that approach. 25 The
court's analysis was well within the framework of Reitman, absent
the repeal aspect, with one noteworthy exception. Not only was the
proposed ordinance found unconstitutional, but the referendum pro-
cedure itself was enjoined.26
The rationale for enjoining the referendum began with the as-
sertion that the court should disregard the "fallacious assumption
that the 'will of the electorate' should invariably prevail." 27 It moved
through an inspection of the tense racial situation of the Milwaukee
summer and concluded that the scheduling of the referendum and
the resulting political campaign would encourage further deterioration
of the social climate and jeopardize the plaintiffs' opportunity to obtain
housing free from discrimination.28 Although the constitutionality
of the proposed statute received the major thrust of the opinion, the
independent "encouraging" effect of the referendum itself and in-
cident debate was at least a secondary factor. Where in Reitman the
Court looked to the encouraging effect of the law as passed, the Otey
court considered that effect prospectively, and the related encouraging
effect of merely presenting the law for public vote.
Holmes v. Leadbetter29 once again presented the Reitman repeal
24 Id. at 273.
25 It could have been argued that other forms of housing legislation were not sub-
jected to a "non-action period" of two years, as open housing laws would have been
under the ordinance (see Wis. STAT. § 9.20 (1967)), and that there was no rational basis
close to any valid state interest to justify the distinction.
26 Prior to Reitman, the California court expressly declined the opportunity to
enjoin the submission of Proposition 14 to the electorate. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d
529, 535, 413 P.2d 825, 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1966).
Judicial authority is somewhat split on the propriety of enjoining referenda on
unconstitutional legislation. Where the proposed law is unconstitutional on its face,
however, most courts would be inclined to issue the injunction. See Tolbert v. Long, 134
Ga. 292, 67 SE. 826 (1910); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 894 P.2d 761
(1964); Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, 131 P.2d 516 (1942). See also Goldner v. Adams,
167 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1964); Gray v. Winthrop, 115 Fla. 721, 156 So. 270 (1934); Schneider
v. Lansdale, 191 Md. 817, 61 A2d 671 (1948). But see Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218,
242 N.W. 687 (1932); State ex rel. Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 188 N.E. 881
(1922); State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Ore. 641, 270 P. 513 (1928); Annot., 19 A.L.R2d
519 (1951).
27 281 F. Supp. at 275.
28 Id. at 277-79.
29 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
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question in the context of an attempt to enjoin a referendum. The
authorization and immunization of a right to discriminate present
in Reitman and Otey were absent here, and the constitutionality of
repeal was considered without these additional elements of encourage-
ment. In Holmes, the city council of Detroit had already enacted a
fair housing ordinance,30 as had been the case in Reitman. A petition
for referendum to repeal31 the ordinance was properly filed, and the
issue was listed for the next election. In granting a permanent injunc-
tion against submission of the issue to the electorate, the court relied
most heavily upon the "encouragement" rationale. The argument
that repeal was a mere return to the status quo was quickly brushed
aside with the observation that there could be no such return in light
of federal and state antidiscrimination provisions.32 Agreeing that,
as a theoretical matter, repeal of a provision forbidding discrimination
did not mean that discrimination was thereby approved by law, the
court moved on to consider the effect of repeal. Plaintiffs' assertion
that repeal would create the impression that it was lawful to discrim-
inate, and thereby encourage such conduct, was apparently adopted
directly from oral argument as part of the opinion. 83 Holmes, therefore,
could be characterized as holding that the "something more" required
by Reitman to invalidate repeal of open housing legislation under
80 Id. at 992.
31 It is not exactly clear from the Holmes opinion whether actual repeal was
involved. According to the referendum provision of the city charter, ordinances passed
by the council were "subject" to a referendum if before they took effect a proper petition
was filed. Id. at 992 n.2. The ordinance in question was to take effect December 31,
1967. Although it would seem from the facts and the language of the referendum pro-
vision that the ordinance never became law since it was "subject" to approval by refer-
endum, the court and counsel treated it as an actual repealer. Id. at 996. Both apparently
construed the referendum provision to mean that laws passed by the council for which
referenda were.requested nonetheless became laws, but were subject to future repeal
by a referendum requested before their effective date.
Whether or not actual repeal of fair housing legislation was involved was investigated
more closely in Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court con-
cluded that the distinction was irrelevant.
82 294 F. Supp. at 993-95. This observation by the court perhaps missed the point
of defendants' argument, since the status quo they were talking about appeared to be the
situation where no local ordinance was in effect, rather than a situation where discrimina-
don itself was legal. Id. at 993. Recognition by both the court and defendants that
repeal would not in fact return the situation to one where discrimination was legal
serves to lessen the importance of the repeal element and lends increased weight to the
"encouragement" aspect of the case arising from the holding of the referendum, regard-
less of its result.
83 Id. at 996. Factual evidence from which this conclusion was drawn was not
set forth in the opinion.
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the fourteenth amendment may be found in encouragement arising
from the repeal itself.
The decision, however, rested on additional and alternative
grounds taking it well beyond the bounds of Reitman. Although in
Reitman the repealer was declared unconstitutional after the referen-
dum, whereas in Holmes conduct of the referendum was enjoined as
unconstitutional state action, it was implicit in Holmes that any repeal
passed by the referendum would have been unconstitutional. However,
additional language about the effect of the referendum itself suggests
that its very occurrence could be a substantial element of the encour-
agement found to violate the fourteenth amendment:
In summary, the arguments against open housing are no longer
valid arguments. Their appeal is to a proscribed result, offensive to
the equality of all our people. Their mere formulation and broad-
cast, embracing, as they do, the assumption that rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution still remain debatable in this com-
munity, cannot avoid having a detrimental effect upon the at-
tempted exercise of constitutional rights.34
This language implies that the conduct of the referendum and the
incident debate would be so colored with state action effectively en-
couraging discrimination as to run afoul of the equal protection
clause~A5 Although the court seemingly sought to modify its stance,36
it did not disclaim the position that state-conducted referenda and
34 Id.
35 The statement could be read to apply as easily to debate on the floor of the
state legislature or to any state-related discussion expressing a negative view toward
antidiscrimination legislation. The first amendment problems arising from such an idea
are staggering. For a discussion of legislative attempts to regulate racially defamatory
speech, see Seeley, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
First Amendment Comments and Questions, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. - (1970). There the
conclusion is reached, either under a "clear and present danger" or "balancing" test,
that a substantial threat of an evil, as great in magnitude as violence, must be likely before
such speech may be proscribed. See also Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Com'rmu L.Q. 261
(1950); Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 595 (1947).
The possible difference between referenda and other legislative deliberations is one
of degree. A full-blown referendum campaign would no doubt have more of an encourag-
ing effect than would private discussions within the state legislature. On this basis, the
former might be precluded under the free speech tests while the latter might not.
36 There being nothing useful to be gained from further debate in the com-
munity upon this issue, it being settled by the cases interpretive of the applicable
constitutional provisions, together with legislation (both state and federal) in
implementation thereof, we do not place decision upon, nor do we reach, the
issue of what is conceded to be the "substantial" exacerbation of public and
private emotions which would arise out of the campaigning for the repeal of,
as well as the retention of, the Fair Housing Ordinance.
294 F. Supp. at 996.
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incident debate were unconstitutional encouragements of discrimi-
nation. Thus, the Holmes decision can be characterized as a strong
assertion that (1) repeals which encourage discrimination are uncon-
stitutional, and (2) state-related activity surrounding the question of
repeal, although not constituting the act of repealer, may nevertheless
violate the fourteenth amendment if its effect upon the public is en-
couragement of discrimination.
A unique twist was added to the referendum question by the
district court opinion in Ranjel v. City of Lansing.7 Ranjel did not
involve authorization or immunization of the right to discriminate
as did Reitman and Otey, or repeal of existing open housing laws as
did Reitman and Holmes. Rather, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a
publicly petitioned referendum to repeal a zoning amendment en-
acted by the city council; that amendment permitted the construction
of a low-rent housing project in a white, middle class suburb. Working
in cooperation with HUD, the city council had selected the area after
careful study of the alternatives. The necessary rezoning to allow
multi-family dwellings was proposed, public hearings were held, and
the amending ordinance was properly passed by the council. A prop-
erly filed petition calling for a public referendum on the zoning change
was presented and the issue was listed for a public vote. At this point,
an injunction against the holding of the referendum was issued by
the federal district court.
Besides relying on the precedents of Reitman, Holmes, and Otey
to find state encouragement of discrimination, the court held that the
referendum would violate the supremacy clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.8 The district court invoked the supremacy clause because
the proposed housing project was authorized under a statute of the
United States and planned under the supervision of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development."9 The opinion noted that a
major policy behind the federal public housing laws, as well as the
regulations of HUD, was the encouragement of racially integrated
residential neighborhoods outside the ghetto,40 and that this policy
implemented the thirteenth amendment through eradication of one
of the badges of slavery. Although the thirteenth amendment did not
by its language abolish the badges of slavery, it did authorize Congress
37 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39 The project was to be constructed as part of the HUD "turnkey program." 293
F. Supp. at 304.
40 Id. at 309.
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to do so by legislation. Congress, in passing public housing legislation,
and HUD, serving as an arm of Congress in promulgating its regu-
lations, were acting to eradicate one of the badges of slavery-segre-
gated housing. State action, repeal of a zoning amendment by referen-
dum, could not be permitted to interfere with this federal legislation
under traditional supremacy clause doctrines.
Even if it is assumed that the referendum would have interfered
with federal -legislation implementing the thirteenth amendment,
other state legislative deliberation regarding the construction of federal
low-rent housing might have had a similar result. Would the court
have enjoined the vote of the city council on the amendment because
it might have refused the rezoning and thereby interfered with the
federal housing program? Would the court have enjoined the city
council from refusing federal funds for its project, thereby interfering
with federal housing? Since state participation in the federal housing
programs is voluntary and viewed as a cooperative enterprise, as was
recognized by the court,41 it is highly unlikely that either question
would be answered in the affirmative.4 Since the city council appar-
ently could have disapproved the amendment or failed to seek funds,
the referendum must have been viewed by the court as different from
the ordinary legislative process. The referendum here could not prop-
erly be called an "increased legislative burden"43 to which only open
housing legislation was subjected,44 since all legislation was potentially
subject to the procedure. The unarticulated difference was that the
referendum procedure offended notions of equal protection or re-
publican form of government. "If referenda of this type were con-
sistently permitted, it would be possible for racially motivated people
to totally prevent implementation of the congressional policy of build-
ing low cost housing outside the ghettos .... ""
The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding in Ranjel4 because there
41 Id. at 304, 310-11.
42 Indeed, the court's conclusion that the city council had properly approved the
project and had worked in close cooperation with HUD in the planning was a strong
point, almost a necessary link, in its argument that the later referendum was an inter-
ference with federal law:
We find that the federal government has fully complied with its self-imposed
obligation to work within the framework of local plans. However, the proposed
referendum at this point unduly impedes implementation of federal policy
under the supremacy clause and must be enjoined.
Ird. at 310-11.
43 See notes 18 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
44 This was the case in Reitman, Otey, and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969);
and the lack of an increased burden was the justification for permitting the referendum
in Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
45 293 F. Supp. at 311.
46 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
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was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the referendum
would encourage discrimination, and because the HUD regulations
relied upon by the district court as paramount federal law were not
included in the Federal Register and therefore did not deserve the
status of federal law for supremacy clause purposes.47 Although the
reversal may have been predicated strictly on factual difficulties, the
opinion demonstrates some hostility to the theories established in prior
cases. The court went to great lengths to establish that there was in-
sufficient evidence of motivation to discriminate behind the referen-
dum petition, but it entirely overlooked the second aspect of the Reit-
man encouragement test-the effect and impact of the referendum-
which is a matter entirely separate from the motivation behind it.
Indeed, the court seemed to raise the question of whether a popular
referendum should ever be enjoined: "[I]f the electors had a legal
right to a referendum, their motive in exercising that right would
be immaterial." 48 Apparently detecting the hint of an attack on the
referendum procedure in the district court opinion, the court of ap-
peals pointed out that the referendum was grounded in neutral prin-
ciple and was not discriminatory by nature.49 In short, this opinion
casts considerable doubt on the vitality of all the encouragement theo-
ries emanating from Reitman-a doubt that may necessitate additional
Supreme Court clarification.
III
RETIEAT FROM Reitman
The first clear indication of retreat from Reitman and the cases
following it appeared in Spaulding v. Blair.50 Spaulding involved an
47 Id. at 322-25.
48 Id. at 324. The statement of the Raniel court that motive is irrelevant flies directly
in the face of the Supreme Court's declaration in Reitman that motive and impact in
the historical context are crucial factors. Perhaps the language can be interpreted as
meaning that the referendum should never be enjoined, regardless of motive, but that
motive may nevertheless be a critical element in later evaluation of the legislation
passed. The court's approval of the approach in Reitman, wherein the California courts
abstained from applying the test until after the referendum was held, supports this
suggestion.
49 Id. The court relied upon the concurring opinion in Hunter v. Erickson for this asser-
tion. The majority in that case, however, found the referendum involved to be a more
difficult burden for a minority group to overcome, thereby suggesting that it was less
than a neutral procedure.. 393 U.S. at 390. The Raniel court overlooked this conflict
with the majority decision in Hunter, and went so far as to assert that even if actual
federal legislation were involved, the Lansing referendum procedure was sufficiently
neutral to avoid a supremacy clause problem. 417 F.2d at 323.
50 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968). This case is noted in 1969 DunE L.J. 185.
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action to enjoin a referendum to consider an open housing law passed
by the Maryland General Assembly. The issue was being submitted
to referendum in accordance with a provision of the Maryland con-
stitution that allowed a referendum on any legislation to be called
by petition of a certain percentage of the electorate. 1 Plaintiffs argued
that holding the referendum would create a potential for repeal of open
housing legislation and thus would be a practical encouragement of
discrimination denying them the equal protection of law guaranteed
under the fourteenth amendment. The court refused to issue the in-
junction and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.
Reitman was distinguished on several grounds. First, it was noted
that no attempt to pass unconstitutional legislation, such as Proposition
14, was involved. The argument that the referendum would encourage
discrimination was less than satisfactorily dismissed by contrasting
some key factors of Reitman and Spaulding. The court noted that
Proposition 14 authorized and immunized a right to discriminate in
the California constitution and made future legislation impossible,
whereas the Maryland referendum had neither characteristic. It was
further observed that true repeal was not involved; since a petition
for referendum had been filed, under the Maryland constitution the
act had never become law. In light of the absence of the true repeal
aspect, the court might have argued that discrimination was not being
authorized or immunized, but it rejected that tack. Rather, it con-
cluded that even if a real repeal were involved it would not issue the
injunction52 since under Reitman "mere repeal" was not enough to
violate the fourteenth amendment. 3
51 No law enacted by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first
day of June next after the session at which it may be passed .... If before said
first day of June there shall have been filed with the Secretary of State a peti-
tion to refer to a vote of the people any law or part of a law capable of
referendum, as in this Article provided, the same shall be referred by the Secre-
tary of State to such vote, and shall not become a law or take effect until
thirty days after its approval by a majority of the electors voting thereon at the
next ensuing election held throughout the State for Members of the House of
Representatives of the United States.
MD. CONsT. art. XVI, § 2.
52 The court argued by analogy that if a state legislator's vote against the act or the
governor's veto could not be enjoined, then neither could the referendum. 403
F.2d at 864. This argument overlooks the different characteristics of the referendum that
would tend to make it more of an encouragement of discrimination than the other
decision-making methods cited. The referendum involves a laige public campaign
before a totally anonymous decision-making body that can better afford to be irresponsible
in campaign methods and invidious in its vote.
63 Id. at 864-65. Certainly the court was aware of the social milieu approach from
its citation of Reitman and the lack of authority in the area other than Otey and Holmes,
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Thus, although several of the elements present in the prior de-
cisions-encouragement by repeal, encouragement by holding of the
referendum-were at least arguably existent in Spaulding, and only
encouragement by authorization and immunization was lacking, the
court seized upon this distinction to justify its finding that the refer-
endum would not promote discrimination. The court asserted further
that, since open housing is firmly established under federal constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, rejection of state law through the
referendum "cannot diminish the rights of any individual or minority
group." 54 This contention entirely overlooks the essence of the encour-
agement rationale. Although repeal or rejection of state open housing
laws cannot technically detract from the protection available under
federal law, if the practical effect is state encouragement of racial dis-
crimination, then rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause
are being violated.
The latest revision of the referendum-repeal doctrine was pro-
vided by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erickson.55 Although Hunter
was factually similar to the earlier cases, the Court substantially ignored
them and decided the case along more traditional lines. Akron, Ohio,
passed a fair housing ordinance in 1964. Subsequently, an amendment
to the city charter, section 137, was enacted by referendum:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron
which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assign-
ment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of any kind or
of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election be-
fore said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect
at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective
until approved by the electors as provided herein.5 6
The plaintiff in Hunter sought enforcement of the fair housing
ordinance by mandamus after the city's refusal to provide relief be-
cause of the charter amendment. The Supreme Court held the charter
amendment unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though in effect a repeal of existing legislation had been accomplished,
although neither was cited. (Ranjel was decided after Spaulding and distinguished
it on the ground that no factual finding of encouragement was made in the Mary-
land case.) The court may have consciously avoided the encouragement approach,
thus foreshadowing the supreme Court's decision in Hunter. See note 63 and accompany-
ing text infra.
54 403 F.2d at 865.
55 893 U.S. 385 (1969). This case is noted in 20 SYAcusE L. Rav. 990 (1969).
56 AKRoN, Omo, CEaLAm § 137, cited in 393 US. at 387.
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the Court expressly declined to hold that the repeal violated the four-
teenth amendment.57 The opinion included a brief observation of
the factual background against which the charter amendment was
enacted,58 but the practical encouragement of discrimination was
not a factor relied upon in the decision. Further, although the refer-
endum procedure provided by the amendment might have effectively
encouraged discrimination, that aspect of the referendum's existence
was similarly by-passed by the Court. Instead, a straight equal protec-
tion approach was taken.
The Court reasoned that imposition of a referendum procedure
drew a distinction between those seeking legislative protection against
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the purchase or sale of
real estate and those who sought to regulate real property transfers in
other ways. The former group was required to have its legislation sub-
mitted to referendum while the latter was not, and no rational basis
for the distinction could be posed.59 In addition, the group subjected
to a greater burden was at least partially determined by a racial classifi-
cation. Thus, increased procedural burden, which was a speculative
basis of Reitman and had been ignored since, became the touchstone
that supplanted the other theories.
The Court's use of this ground alone creates serious questions
about the continued vitality of the other approaches that might have
been taken under the Hunter facts. Repeal in a factual situation where
patterns of discrimination were present could have been found to
implicate the state in practically encouraging discrimination. The
courts in Reitman through Hunter, however, have found basically
unpalatable the proposition that legislation once passed cannot be
repealed. Thus, they continually offer reminders that "mere repeal
is not enough"; 0 when confronted by a situation of repeal, the court
must search for "something more." In Reitman, the establishment
of a right to discriminate in the state constitution, as well as the en-
57 893 US. at 390 n.5.
5s [T]he population of Akron consists of "people of different race, color, religion,
ancestry or national origin, many of whom live in circumscribed and segregated
areas, under sub-standard, unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded
conditions, because of discrimination in the sale, lease, rental and financing of
housing."
Id. at 391, quoting the preamble to the open housing ordinance that was suspended by
§ 137.
59 The Court was unimpressed with the state's justification of "mov[ing] slowly in
the delicate area of race relations." Id. at 392.
60 Id. at 390 n.5; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967); Spaulding v. Blair,
403 F.2d 862, 864-65 (4th Cir..1968).
[Vol. 55:881
PUBLIC REFERENDUM
couragement of discrimination arising from the public vote and the
repeal, provided the additional elements. The practical encouragement
of discrimination in situations of repeal, 61 as well as in those indepen-
dent of repeal, 62 has been the basis in post-Reitman cases for enjoining
public votes and finding the legislation unconstitutional. Yet whether
state action effectively operates to encourage discrimination has now
become an issue that the Supreme Court apparently would prefer to
avoid.63
Another aspect of the Hunter rationale, however, opens the door
to exploration of an area traditionally avoided by the Court. The
majority found that the referendum provision violated equal protec-
tion because it subjected those with an interest in the passage of open
housing legislation to a greater procedural burden than those con-
cerned with other types of real property legislation. Thus far the equal
protection attack was not racially based, for it was only the difference
in procedures that created the problem. The opinion went on, how-
61 Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
62 Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
63 See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), where the majority gave no considera-
tion to encouragement of discrimination resulting from the Georgia courts' voiding of a
trust and returning the trust property to the heirs when a racially-restrictive purpose
could not be carried out. Only Justice Brennan in dissent called attention to the ap-
plicability of the encouragement rationale. Id. at 457-58.
The Court's reluctance is perhaps reasonable, for the encouragement approach could
raise grave difficulties in other areas of application. For instance, what of a prosegrega-
don campaign for re-election being conducted by an incumbent state governor? Obviously,
the discourse surrounding such a campaign would be as encouraging to discriminators
as would the referendum campaigns enjoined in prior cases. Would not this public posi-
tion being assumed by a governor place the authority of the state behind it? If one is
satisfied that the campaigning governor can be viewed as acting outside his official ca-
pacity, what of public statements by a state attorney general or other officer against the
implementation of civil rights legislation? Or, carrying out the referendum analogy,
what should be done about statements by state legislators on or off the legislative floor
in opposition to the passage or enforcement of antidiscrimination provisions? Or what
of a resolution emanating from a state legislature condemning integrationist policies?
E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 4065.3 (1957); Miss. S. Con. Res. 125, ch. 466, [1956] Miss. Laws
741-44. The point to be made is simply that state officials, by virtue of their status as
public figures and the realities of politics, are often in a position where the stance they
assume on a matter becomes the stance behind which the authority of the state comes to
rest. Yet the right to assume such positions, and to fully debate their relative merits is
traditionally a sacred area under the first amendment. Were the Court to become in-
volved in regulating speech carrying with it the aura of state authority because such
speech encouraged racial discrimination, myriad political campaigns, legislative debates,
and perhaps even HEW requests for delays of desegregation deadlines might fall under
its scrutiny. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 21 (1969). Recog-
nizing the infinite possibilities for conflict with first amendment freedoms, the Court, it
is suggested, will take pains to avoid future use of the encouragement rationale unless
the factual situation is one devoid of free speech implications.
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ever, to evaluate the nature of a referendum itself and suggested that
a referendum is inherently a greater burden for a racial minority:
[T]he reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority.
The majority needs no protection against discrimination and if
it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that.
Like the law requiring specification of candidates' race on the bal-
lot, . . . § 137 places special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process. This is no more permissible than deny-
ing them the vote, on an equal basis with others.64
The clear suggestion of this language is that section 137 was found
unconstitutional not only because one group was subjected to an ad-
ditional procedural burden without justification, but also because that
burden, the referendum, was by its nature a greater hurdle for minority
groups to overcome. Thus, subjecting minority group legislation to
referenda violated the equal protection clause, even when in theory
all legislation could be subjected to the same procedure, since it im-
posed upon the minority group a greater burden than that resulting
from the realities of numbers alone. Justices Harlan and Stewart con-
curred in the result, but found that the referendum by its inherent
nature did not offend the equal protection clause. It was only because
the Akron provision applied a specially burdensome procedure to
open housing legislation that it violated the fourteenth amendment.65
The majority analysis of the nature of referenda certainly raises
some unique equal protection points that might be better based upon
the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government.
IV
THE DEVELOPING TkEoms
A. The Intent-Effect Analysis
A survey of the case authority66 warrants a conclusion that the
isolated act of repeal does not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Instead, the circumstances that surround the act are determinative.
If the intent behind the repeal is to encourage racial discrimination,
and the state allows that intent to be carried out, some courts would
64 393 U.S. at 391.
65 Id. at 562 (concurring opinion).
66 The following chart hopefully will be helpful in keeping track of the various
theories developed in the treatment of the cases:
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find state action violative of the fourteenth amendment.67 Although
in all of the opinions considering both intent and effect a greater em-
phasis was given to the former, 8 without exception the effect of en-
couraging discrimination was also found. Therefore, no authority
can be said to exist for the proposition that intent without effect is
enough. The converse is not necessarily true, however. The Holmes
court considered that repeal in effect would be "taken by many as an
invitation to further unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination," 69
and made no appraisal of the intent involved. This analysis of Holmes,
when combined with the critical importance of the effect of encour-
aging discrimination in Reitman and Otey, could lead to a conclusion
that the state may not involve itself in repeals or other activities that
actually have the effect of encouraging racial discrimination, regardless
of the intent behind the acts.70 Perhaps fear of such an interpretation
has prompted the courts to reiterate that mere repeal is not a four-
teenth amendment violation.
To resolve the intent versus effect quandary, substantial weight
was given to intent in determining effect in all of the opinions that
followed Reitman, except Holmes. Thus, where intent can be estab-
Encouragement Authorization Encouragement Increased Discriminatory
by Repeal of Right to by Holding Legislative Nature of
Discriminate Referendum Burden Referendum
Reitman V V x
Otey V V x x
Holmes V V x
Ranjel (D.C.) V V x
Ranjel (CA.) x o o o
Spaulding x o x o
Hunter x x / V
v-element present and relied upon by the court
x-element arguably present but not relied upon
o-element expressly found absent or rejected
67 E.g., Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 273 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
68 An easy explanation for the emphasis is that although considerable evidence con-
cerning the motives and activities of the proponents of repeal was available, factual evi-
dence regarding an effect that had not yet occurred was difficult to obtain.
09 294 F. Supp. at 995.
70 Under this rationale would a repeal of ineffective state antidiscrimination laws in
order to facilitate use of federal procedures without the requisite exhaustion of local
remedies run afoul of equal protection? This problem is more than hypothetical, be-
cause the exhaustion aspects of the Open Housing Act of 1968, §§ 810(c), 812(a), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3610(c), 3612(a) (Supp. IV, 1969), might turn an ineffective state procedure into an
impediment to accomplishing open housing. See Frakt, Administrative Enforcement of
Equal Opportunity Legislation in New Jersey, 21 RurTms L. Rv. 442 (1967).
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lished, effect, with the resultant fourteenth amendment violation, is
likely to be found.71 Where no demonstrable intent to encourage dis-
crimination is present, but rather a good faith motive is involved, a
court certainly would be less inclined to find an encouraging effect.
Of course, this cannot be taken as an absolute. Where a motive is not
offensive but the likelihood of encouraging discrimination is great,
state action should probably be enjoined. However, the judicial fact
finding concerning effect has thus far been less than rigorous. Stipula-
tions and arguments of counsel, 72 determinations as to motive,73 and
great reliance upon almost nonexistent lower court findings74 have
been the factual considerations upon which findings of effect have
been based. The judicial approach has been to assume the effect from
the intent and the factual milieu. Only in Otey was the testimony
of professional sociologists as to effect relied upon by the court.75 Not
71 Spaulding, Hunter, and the court of appeals's disposition of Ranjel should also be
considered in assessing the intent-effect analysis. In those cases the courts entirely ignored
the effect of the repeal and the holding of the referendum, and only Raniel considered
the intent element. Emphasis upon the effect of repeal or other related state action
presents extremely difficult problems of proof. Before the requisite effect can be found,
what portion of the public must interpret the state's action as encouragement of dis-
crimination? Must that interpretation result from some factor for which the state is
responsible, or may it be caused by misinformation emanating from private sources? A
public misunderstanding of the repeal was one of the factors considered as an encourage-
ment in Holmes. 294 F. Supp. at 996. Can the state, by circulating its own information,
counteract the effect of an erroneous public interpretation? By what realistic means can
a court purport beforehand to assess the effect that a repeal or referendum will have
on a majority or, for that matter, on any segment of the public?
72 Id. at 995.
73 Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301, 306-08 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
74 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 869, 378-79 (1967).
The lower court opinion in Reitman made the following evaluation of the facts:
The question of the fact of discrimination, by whatever hand, should give
us little pause. The very nature of the instant action and the specific con-
tentions urged by the defendants must be deemed to constitute concessions on
their part that article I, section 26, provides for nothing more than a purported
constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly
would be unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be
involved.
64 Cal. 2d at 536, 413 P.2d at 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (emphasis by the court).
75 The following detailed testimony was heard in Otey:
In regard to the pre-referendum period, Dr. Hauser testified as to the detri-
mental effect of unnecessary political debate, in and of itself, on the psyche of
disadvantaged minority group members. Moreover, in context of probable harm
to the community, Mr. Ben Barkin, an eminent local public relations man active
in community affairs, testified that prospect of a vote on the referendum ques-
tion would further galvanize public opinion and elicit heated polemicizing, which
in turn would be augmented by fund raising, billboard advertising, and all the
other trappings of a full-fledged election campaign. The issue itself is so volatile
as to be explosive if sparked by campaign bally-hoo. To schedule the referen-
dum, Dr. Hauser concluded, would thus be the "equivalent of throwing a lighted
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until the reversal of Ranjel did a court demand a strict standard of
proof, and that was applied in regard to the finding of intent.76 Ob-
viously, judicial standards are required and a more intense fact-finding
effort is necessary if the effect of encouraging discrimination is to con-
tinue as a basis for fourteenth amendment violation.77
B. The Increased Legislative Burden Analysis
After Hunter, any system which on its face subjects the passage
of antidiscrimination laws to an additional legislative hurdle, regard-
less of what that hurdle is, will be found prima facie to violate the
fourteenth amendment.78 However, the problem of Spaulding v. Blair
must be reconsidered. In light of Hunter, is "the Maryland constitu-
tional procedure by which antidiscrimination legislation was subjected
to referendum now unconstitutional? Certainly Hunter can be read
to exclude that result since the Akron ordinance specifically subjected
only open housing legislation to the additional procedure, while the
Maryland provision allowed all new laws to be so reviewed.
Suppose, however, that the Akron anti-integration forces, after
a careful reading of Spaulding, came forth with an amended proposal
subjecting all new city ordinances to referendum review on petition
by a certain percentage of the electorate. Would the legislative history
surrounding this supposedly neutral proposal be sufficient to taint
it under the fourteenth amendment? The intent analysis of the prior
decisions lends some weight to that position, and the Supreme Court's
fuse into a keg of gunpowder." Dr. Hauser's testimony as to the explosiveness
of the present climate was corroborated by Mr. Barkin and Dr. O'Reilly, Profes-
sor of Social Work, University of Wisconsin.
281 F. Supp. at 278.
76 417 F.2d 321, 524 (6th Cir. 1969).
77 'act finding in this area is a particularly difficult endeavor. Nevertheless, em-
pirical methods, such as those utilized by social scientists in the Proposition 14 study,
are available to litigants. See note 84 infra.
78 In Valtierra v. City of San Jose Housing Authority, 38 U.S.L.W. 2528 (N.D. Cal.
March 23, 1970), cert. granted- sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 38 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. June 8,
1970), the federal district court followed Hunter in voiding, under the equal protection
clause, article 34 of the California constitution. The invalidated provision had required
referendum approval before state agencies could seek federal funding for low-income
housing projects, while such approval was not required for participation in other
federally-supported programs. The referendum requirement was found to be a "special
burden" imposed upon the poor and minorities without any legitimate state legislative
objective. The city's argument that no discriminatory intent was involved was quickly
dismissed by the court's observation that lack of bad motive does not cure an otherwise
discriminatory scheme. 38 U.S.L.W. at 2529; see text at notes 71-77 supra.
Adopted in 1950, the California provision may explain that state's unusually small
increase in low-rent housing. Although 8% of the American poor reside in California,
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
citation in Hunter of Anderson v. Martin79 provides additional sup-
port. In that case the Court looked at the purpose and the legislative
background"0 of Louisiana's requirement that the race of a candidate
be included on the ballot to overcome the state's contention that the
provision was neutral since it applied equally to all races. Although
the Louisiana provision contained a racial reference on its face that
the hypothetical act is lacking, language in Anderson precludes the
state from providing a "vehicle by which . . .prejudice may be so
aroused as to operate against one group because of race."81 Even when
the state's abstract position is neutral, Anderson could. be applied to
the nominally color-blind referendum provision. Thus, some problems
exist for those who would enact a Maryland-type provision for a ra-
cially-discriminatory purpose, at least so long as that purpose can
be factually established.
But what of a jurisdiction, such as Maryland, that has a long-
standing referendum procedure that was not enacted for a discrimina-
tory purpose? In Otey and Holmes use of such a procedure was not
permitted where it would factually encourage discrimination. Failure
to find factual encouragement in Spaulding, the reversal of Raniel,
and the avoidance of that entire approach in Hunter, however, place
the rationale upon shaky ground. Can it be concluded, therefore,
under Spaulding, at least where no finding of encouragement is made,
that every piece of antidiscrimination legislation passed by a state can
be subjected systematically to a "neutral" referendum procedure,
when no other type of legislation as a practical matter is so reviewed?
This question immediately calls to mind Yick Wo v. Hopkins 2 and
the proposition that a law fair and impartial on its face cannot, under
the fourteenth amendment, be applied in a manner that discriminates
they are provided with only 4% of this country's low-income housing. During the duration
of article 34, 48% of the low-income projects proposed had been rejected, leaving
California with only Vs the number of low-rent units per poor family as exist in New
York or Illinois. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1970, at 28, col. 5.
79 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
80 "This addition to the statute in the light of 'private attitudes and pressures'
towards Negroes at the time of its enactment could only result in that 'repressive ef-
fect'...." Id. at 403 (footnote omitted).
81 Id. at 402.
82 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo involved an ordinance that forbad the operation
of a laundry without the consent of a board of supervisors. This consent was systematic-
ally withheld from Chinese laundrymen. See also Ho Ala Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252
(No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879), which involved a requirement that all prison-
ers' hair be cut short as applied against Chinese wearing the traditional queue. As to
them, it was found to operate as cruel and unusual punishment.
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against any particular group.83 Thus, even where the referendum
procedure is neutral on its face and was not passed for a discriminatory
purpose, it cannot systematically be utilized only to review antidis-
crimination legislation. Such use practically applies an increased legis-
lative burden in violation of the equal protection doctrine of Yick Wo.
The hypothetical abuse of the referendum procedure differs from the
available precedents because, in the latter, a state officer was responsi-
ble for the discriminatory application of the law, whereas in the
referendum situation, the voters by their petitions would be applying
the law unequally. This discrepancy can be overcome by the findings
in Otey and Holmes that the referenda were sufficiently colored by
state action to fall within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment
despite their basic nature as "acts of the people."
V
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE NATURE OF REFERENDA
After this examination of encouraging referenda, expressly and
practically burdensome referenda, and referenda created for a discrim-
inatory purpose, some consideration must be given to the referendum
itself as an abstract legislative method. Does submission of minority
group legislation to a referendum violate equal protection because of
the inherent nature of the procedure itself? The Spaulding court, the
court of appeals in Ranjel, and Justices Harlan and Stewart concurring
in Hunter thought not, but the majority in Hunter at least raised
that possibility.
It is difficult to contend that a referendum denies equal protec-
tion to racial minority groups because those groups are smaller in
number and thus have less political power in a public vote; all groups
suffer from the same weakness in selecting their legislative representa-
tion. A voting system that affords a relatively weaker position to a
group because of size does not thereby deprive that group of equal
83 The Court noted more recently in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), that
while the peremptory jury challenge was a neutral device aimed at removing bias for
or against the parties, a systematic case by case exclusion of blacks from jury service
by the prosecutor might support the inference that the system was being used to deny
an equal right to participate in the judicial process. In Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145 (1965), a unanimous Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Louisiana
constitution requiring that every voter be able to understand and interpret the state
or Federal Constitution when read by the registrar because registrars were applying the
test more stringently to Negroes.
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protection. There must be something special, therefore, about racial
minorities and referenda that offends the concept of equal protection.
Within the current social milieu it is predictable that referendum
voting by non-members of a racial minority will be in opposition to
legislation favorable to that minority because of prejudice.8 4 This
factor does not affect other interest groups, since they may expect to
win or lose a referendum through a vote by a basically neutral
majority. Thus, the referendum differs from other legislative methods
because it provides a procedure whereby legislative decisions can be
made exclusively along the lines of racial prejudice. Although some
automatic opposition on the basis of race might be expected in a state
legislature, representatives must take a public position for which they
are responsible. They must debate and discuss issues along somewhat
rational lines if they hope to be re-elected by the public.8 5 The
referendum decision-making process is totally different. There, the
individual voter is responsible to no one for his decision. Indeed, that
individual's decision may never be known. He need not be informed
on the merits, and he may vote along whatever irrational lines sway
him. In short, he can easily discriminate on the basis of race.86
The unique situation of the racial minority group gives rise to
equal protection arguments along two lines. The first can be drawn
84 For an analysis of the voting patterns in the Proposition 14 election, see Wolfinger
& Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum
Voting, 62 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 753 (1968). The authors carefully analyzed the voting re-
sults to demonstrate that voter error or misunderstanding was not the source of Propo-
sition 14's passage. Rather, they conclude that varying degrees of racial prejudice were
involved. Id. at 764. Assessing the referendum as a legislative tool, they present the view
of contemporary political scientists as follows:
[I]t is more common to assume that asking voters to pass judgment on substan-
tive policy questions strains their information and interest, leading them to
decisions that may be inconsistent with their own desires. The consequence is
subversion of representative government and the exercise of undue influence by
groups that can afford to gather the signatures to qualify a measure for the
referendum ballot and then wage a publicity campaign that will have an impact
on voters.
Id. at 767.
85 Effective minority group voting power has become a significant restraint on local
legislative irresponsibility. See, e.g., Note, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: An Evaluation,
3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 357, 373-75 (1968).
86 Graphic examples of the gap between acts of the elected representatives of the
people and the voters themselves are presented by Reitman and Hunter. In both cases
legislative representatives, had enacted antidiscrimination legislation. The referendum
votes for repeal in Reitman outnumbered negative votes by over two to one. Note 6
supra. Yet after Proposition 14 was struck down, no successful attempts to weaken civil
rights laws were carried out within the legislature. The Akron ordinance was likewise
passed by the city council and then effectively overturned by the voters.
[Vol. 55:881
PUBLIC REFERENDUM
from Anderson v. Martin.7 The state cannot promote a system that
facilitates the operation of private racial discrimination. In Anderson,
it was the indication of race on the ballot. In Nixon v. Condon,88 it
was a state statute allowing the qualifications for membership in a
political party to be set by the party's executive committee, when
that committee utilized race as a membership criterion. In Shelley v.
Kraemer, 9 it was the judicial enforcement of privately agreed upon ra-
cial covenants. It can reasonably be contended that the state is likewise
precluded from utilizing a legislative method for considering pro-
minority group legislation that facilitates reliance upon racial pre-
judice in determining its passage or defeat. Just as in Condon, where
the state was not permitted to allow a body that discriminated on the
basis of race to decide party membership, the state should not be
permitted to allow a group that will use racial prejudice as a critical
factor to decide the passage or rejection of legislation. This does not
mean that a referendum can never be used without impairing the
rights of racial minorities. It is only when the law being considered is
one that is susceptible to racial bias, and the social milieu is such
that it is highly predictable that referendum voting will be on the
basis of race, that the procedure can be said to violate equal protection
as a state-provided vehicle for discrimination.
A second equal protection argument can be drawn from such
cases as Griffin v. Illinois"° and Douglas v. California1 in which the
state was required to supply trial transcripts and appellate counsel to
convicted indigents: equal protection is not always provided by equal
treatment. Equal imposition of fees upon rich and poor alike was not
satisfactory in Griffin or Douglas. Rather, the fourteenth amendment
required that unequals be treated unequally to ensure ultimate fair-
ness in the judicial process.92 Racial minority groups, it can be argued,
are similarly unequal and therefore entitled to unequal treatment in
the legislative process. They are unequal because the proposal of
legislation in their behalf provokes a host of irrationalities related to
racial prejudice that other interest groups seeking legislation do not
face. Thus, to say that a referendum procedure is fair because it
applies equally to all groups does not take into account the inherent
87 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
88 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
89 334 US. 1 (1948).
90 351 US. 12 (1956).
91 372 US. 353 (1963).
92 See Karst & Horowitz 65.
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disadvantages of racial minorities, apart from small numbers, in the
present political and social environment.
The equal protection clause obviously does not require the state
to provide special treatment to account for inequalities in all situa-
tions. Flat licensing fees, sales taxes, and numerous other state-imposed
charges fail to take account of the economic inequalities recognized
in Griffin and Douglas. Yet where highly important rights such as
access to the criminal appeal process or to the civil courts93 are in-
volved, unequal treatment is necessary to assure ultimate fairness
under the equal protection clause. It can be argued that access to the
legislative process is no less important a right than access to the
judicial system, and that special treatment necessary to afford fair
access is required by the fourteenth amendment. Thus, legislation
protecting racial minorities should not be submitted for ratification
to a body likely to respond solely on the basis of irrational prejudice.
Submission to a representative legislature is the preferable alterna-
tive.94
93 See Suber v. Suber, 88 U.S.L.W. 2169 (N.J. Super. Aug. 25, 1969), holding that
the state may not, under the equal protection clause, deny access to the divorce courts
to those who cannot pay the publication fee.
94 The presence of the legislature as a viable alternative is an important qualifier
to the equal protection theory here expounded. For example, if carried to extremes,
the theory would proscribe the holding of an election in which one of the candidates
was subject to racial bias in the vote. In this situation the election would be a state-
provided vehicle for the expression of racial discrimination, and the candidate subject
to racial bias would be faced with an inherently greater burden in the election process
than one not so subject. Yet what would be the appropriate remedy? The courts could
hardly enjoin the election and name the winner since no prior stage of legislative ap-
proval was present, nor would they be likely to enjoin the holding of the election
and allow the public office to remain vacant. This latter remedy would be a possibility
if the court viewed the majority vote election system as so discriminatory as to violate
the fourteenth amendment, and therefore deemed it necessary for the state to devise a
constitutional alternative or do without the election.
This conclusion is unnecessary, however, for the election system differs substantially
from the referendum problems examined herein. First, with the referendum problem,
a very viable and in fact more traditional means of passing upon legislation is readily
available in the state legislature, whereas no other traditional method of candidate
selection is present. Secondly, a usual prerequisite for the enjoining of a referendum is
a discriminatory purpose or motive behind it. Where a minority group candidate enters
a political race, motives of promoting or encouraging discrimination are not involved.
In addition, referenda involve particular legislation that can be identified as discrimina-
tory, while candidates do not present the same easily identifiable narrow characteristics
but rather put together positions on myriad public issues unrelated to race.
Even though all of these distinctions can be drawn to separate the election from
the referendum, they are not entirely satisfactory. Perhaps the result compelled by the
equal protection theory of inherent burden is that a majority vote system must somehow
take account of the disadvantages it works upon racial minorities-i.e., weighted voting.
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These equal protection arguments, it must be granted, extend
beyond traditional lines and at least to some degree torture the pre-
cedents. This is not surprising, however, because the equal protection
clause is not the best means of treating the problem with which this
discussion is concerned. The protection of minority groups from the
capriciousness of pure majority rule was afforded separate constitu-
tional protection in the guarantee of a republican form of government.
VI
REFERENDA AND THE REPUBLICAN FoRM OF GOVERNMENT 95
Inherent in the concept of a republican form of government is
protection of the minority from capricious majority rule through a
system of representative government. The republican form of govern-
ment argument is raised here because the referenda involved in the
cases under discussion were, as a legislative method, the antithesis of
representative government. A fear of direct democracy has often been
characterized as the moving force of the Constitutional Convention,
and the entire idea of republican or representative government was a
product of that apprehension; one need only examine the convention
debates for myriad references contrasting democracy with republi-
canism."6 James Madison was perhaps the greatest proponent of re-
It is highly doubtful that a court would ever try to impose such a requirement, how-
ever, or that it would be desirable to do so. The theoretical problems developing at
this stage point up the difficulty of attempting to treat under the equal protection clause
problems that were afforded an entirely different constitutional protection under the
republican form guarantee.
95 The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
90 See generally J. MADIsoN, NoTrs oF DEBATEs IN THE FEDnMAL CONvENTION OF 1787
(Ohio Univ. ed. 1966). See in particular the debates for June 9-12. A brief summary of
the drafters' concept of republican form is provided in Adrienne Koch's introduction
to this work:
Both terms, "democracy" and "Republic," prove to be double-barreled if
one takes a closer look. As Madison never tired of repeating, there is direct
democracy, feasible only for small communities like the ancient city-states, for
example, where simple majority rule holds sway and where all who are citizens
cast their vote, in congregations of the whole people (or as many as present
themselves). One must grant that there were few if any "democrats" of this
persuasion-theoretical or practicing-in the Convention. For Madison, "simple"
democracy of this type was irrelevant to an "extensive" country and pernicious
wherever it might be applied because of its failure to provide protection for
the rights of minorities. He distrusted this simple or direct democracy for its
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publicanism, and, fittingly, his writings have been used by the courts
to justify some recent referendum decisions97 in what may be deemed
cryptic references to a republican form of government rationale:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary
to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Govern-
ment is the mere instrument of the major number of the Con-
stituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet suffi-
ciently attended to .... 98
The judicial history of the republican form guarantee is a matter
that warrants attention. The guarantee clause was first considered by
the Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, 9 a case arising out of a Rhode
Island political conflict between two factions, each claiming to be the
lawful government of the state. The Court was faced with deciding
which of the two governments was in fact the lawful one. Justice.
Taney, writing for the Court, found that the issue was not one for the
judiciary to decide. He reasoned that Congress must decide which is
the government and whether it is republican upon admitting a state to
minimal use of deliberative judgment, exercised in a favoring atmosphere of
limited powers with opportunities for debating, rethinking, and reasonably de-
ciding intricate issues of moment. At the mercy of this type of simple direct
democracy were especially the propertied few (compared to the propertyless
many) and wise and honest leaders who would tend to be cast aside in favor of
demagogues ....
On the other hand, representative democracy was in fact what Madison was
prepared to endorse. Because of the need for adjectival qualification, he preferred
to use the term "Republic"-especially since a strong tradition of political
thought which was opposed to monarchy and centered in the doctrine of human
equality had appealed to Americans since the rise of the Revolutionary senti-
ment. The maxim "he who wears the shoe, knows best where it pinches" was
the ancient and honorable cardinal principle of Republicanism. Thus the consent
of the governed is the only legitimate basis of government, for it alone abolishes
the prescriptive subordination of men in society into super and subordinate
classes. Madison himself in innumerable contexts defined what he meant by a
Republic, and each definition makes it clear that he meant a democratic repub-
lic or a representative democracy.
Id. at xix-xx (emphasis in original).
The Federalist Papers also define representative government as one of the elements
of republicanism. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (Ford ed. 1898) (J. Madison). Thomas
Jefferson and Patrick Henry apparently concurred. See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause
*of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. Rav. 513,
526 (1962).
97 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Otey v.
Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 275 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
98 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting
5 J. MADISON, WILITINGs 272 (Hunt ed. 1904) (emphasis in original).
99 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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the union, and that either Congress or the President is authorized to
provide the protections of the guarantee. Interference by the judiciary
was found to be unwarranted in light of the power granted to the
political departments.
Although in its first encounter with the guarantee clause the
Court in essence found a nonjusticiable issue, it did not summarily
dismiss the next cases brought under the clause on that basis. In Minor
v. Happersett,oo it considered whether a denial of the franchise to
women violated the guarantee clause and concluded that the forms
of government of the states at the time of admittance to the union
were "unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form."'' 1 In
In re Duncan,0 2 the Court evaluated the recognized Texas govern-
ment against its definition of republican form-
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is
guaranteed to every State in the Union, and the distinguishing
feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws
in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies,
whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people them-
selves; but, while the people are thus the source of political power,
their governments, National and State, have been limited by writ-
ten constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to
their own power, as against the sudden impulses of mere majori-
ties. 0 3
In 1912, however, with Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Oregon,'04 the Court closed the door on republican form of govern-
ment claims by returning to the rationale of Luther v. Borden that
such claims were nonjusticiable political questions.1 5 Pacific States
involved the very issue that lies at the heart of the present considera-
tion: whether state initiative and referendum provisions are violative
100 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
101 Id. at 176.
102 189 U.S. 449 (1891).
103 Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
Again in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the Court considered the guarantee
in ruling that Congress could legitimately appoint officials in the territories,
[n]otwithstanding its duty to "guarantee to every State in this Union a republican
form of government," . . . by which we understand, according to the definition
of Webster, "a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole
body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them" . . . .
Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
104 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
105 The Court summarily stated: " 'It was long ago settled that the enforcement of
this guarantee belonged to the political department.'" Id. at 149, quoting Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 US. 548, 578 (1900).
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of the guarantee clause. Although the Court made no comment on the
merits, its holding was presumed to foreclose the possibility of future
republican form claims and has been consistently followed.108 Thus,
while the discrimination-prone referendum arguably violates the guar-
antee clause principle of representative government as a protection
against pure majority rule, it might be that this claim will never be
heard in other than an academic forum. Recent Supreme Court cases,
however, indicate that there may yet be some vitality in the guarantee
clause.
Until the decisions in Baker v. Cart'07 and Reynolds v. Sims'08
the clause indeed seemed a dead letter. In Baker, however, the Court
embarked upon a detailed review of the guarantee clause and concluded
that claims under it "involve those elements which define a 'political
question,' and for that reason and no other, they are nonjusticiable."'10
Factors thought to identify the guarantee clause as a political matter
were drawn from Luther v. Borden as follows:
The commitment to the other branches of the decision as to
which is the lawful state government; the unambiguous action by
the President, in recognizing the charter government as the lawful
authority; the need for finality in the executive's decision; and
the lack of criteria by which a court could determine which form
of government was republican. 110
As was the case in Baker, only the final factor is relevant to the
referendum challenge since no question of competing governments
or validity of an entire state government is involved.' It is true that
"republican form," even as defined by reference to constitutional
106 Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 141 (1913); Marchall v. Dye, 231
U.S. 250 (1913); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hilde-
brant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917);
Ohio ex 'el. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-56
(1939).
107 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
108 877 U.S. 533 (1964).
109 369 U.S. at 218.
110 Id. at 222.
111 The question as to which is the valid government of a state and whether that
government is a valid one is a determination made by Congress in its decision to admit
a state to the union. There is a need for finality here, since a large number of trans-
actions, and virtually every official act of the state could later be found invalid if the
entire government were subject to periodic challenge. This is not the case with testing
the validity of the referendum in reference to a single legislative act. In making this de-
termination there is no question as to which is the government or whether it is a valid
one, but only the narrow issue of whether a particular legislative method can be used
in a particular situation.
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history and the early decisions, does not have a clearly delineated mean-
ing. In the reapportionment situation of Baker, it would have been
difficult indeed to apply this nebulous standard to test the representa-
tiveness of the government there involved. But one element in the
definition of republican form is clear-the government must be a
representative one. Although testing degrees of representation in legis-
lative apportionment cases may be impossible under the guarantee
clause for lack of a standard, and therefore a political question, evalu-
ating whether or not a governmental system is representative at all is
a far easier matter.112 The Baker Court suggested that "the political
question barrier was no[t] absolute"" 3 in exactly this context when it
observed that a military government would be subject to challenge
under the clause; a military government would be so obviously non-
representative and therefore non-republican that it could be identified
as such even under an imprecise standard. A system that subjects pro-
minority group legislation already passed by representative govern-
ment" 4 to approval by absolute majority vote is similarly an obvious
denial of a republican form of government. It is not representative at
all, and it subjects the minority to exactly the kind of capriciousness
that the guarantee clause was intended to prevent." 5 Thus, the discrim-
ination-prone referendum should not be liable to political question
objections for lack of an applicable standard.l"
Other encouraging language appears in the observation in Rey-
nolds v. Sims"i7 that "some questions raised under the Guaranty Clause
are nonjusticiable, where 'political' in nature and where there is a
clear absence of judicially manageable standards."" 8 The implication
is that where the issue is not political, and where there is no clear
absence of a manageable standard, guarantee clause claims may be
112 "[f]f the guaranty clause intrinsically raises political questions, this cannot be
because it 'is not a repository of judicially manageable standards.' Its standards are not
any more nebulous than those of the equal protection clause in this context." Mc-
Closkey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 63 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
See also Bonfield, Baker v. Cart: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Repub-
lican Government, 50 CAL F. L. REv. 245, 250 (1962); Bonfield, supra note 96, at 526.
113 369 U.S. at 222 nA8.
114 This was the situation in Reitman, Holmes, Ranjel, Spaulding, and Hunter.
115 See text at note 103 supra.
116 The justiciability of the referendum question gains support from this analysis
in Baker; however, the actual holding in the case affirmed the position that republican
form claims were indeed political questions. Although the claim before it might have
been brought under the guarantee clause, the Baker Court refused to allow this to af-
fect its justiciability under the fourteenth amendment.
"17 377 US. 533 (1964).
118 Id. at 582.
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treated by the courts. It certainly can be argued that challenges to the
referendum procedure as a legislative method are not colored by the
political aspects of recognizing state governments, which is committed
to another branch. Nor is there a need for a single, final voice as in
the foreign relations or war power areas. Furthermore, the test of
whether a system is representative at all is not without any manageable
standard."0
CONCLUSION
In order to avoid the political question doctrine, referendum
challenges, like the apportionment cases, must rely on the equal pro-
tection clause. Arguments might be made to take the referendum
situation outside the political question area, but it is unlikely that
the Court will abandon its traditional view of the guarantee clause.
This is unfortunate because the republican form of government
guarantee, defined by its constitutional and judicial history to mean
representative government as a protection against majority rule, is
exactly the constitutional right being violated by the discrimination-
prone referendum.
If the courts are to continue to scrutinize referenda on minority
group legislation, it is likely that their approach will be along the lines
of either express or operative legislative burden, or evaluation of the
nature of the referendum, rather than a "practical encouragement"
rationale. The extensions of that analysis are simply too fraught with
first amendment difficulties, and the findings of fact to support it are
too speculative for responsible judicial application.120
119 The Reynolds language must be read in context, however, and the Court's point
was that a state government's admission as "republican" in form did not insulate it from
later attack under the equal protection clause.
120 As for the question of "repeal plus something more," it remains to be seen
whether practical encouragement resulting from the repeal itself will be a sufficient ad-
ditional element to constitute a fourteenth amendment violation. It will be recalled
that in the post-Reitman cases involving enjoining of the referenda; the campaigns, the
debate, and the holding of the vote were considered to be unconstitutional encourage-
ment. Reitman required repeal plus encouragement, but a substantial portion of its
encouragement resulted from the act of repeal itself. Use of the encouragement rationale
with campaigns or referenda creates broad first amendment problems that are not
present when only the validity of the act of repeal itself is being considered. However,
to assume encouragement from every act of repeal is to foreclose the legislative process.
If the repeal-encouragement analysis is to have continued vitality, honest and diligent
judicial investigations of the actual long term effect of repeal on the public will have
to be made. Intensive study of sociological data by professionals would seem to be a
prerequisite to such proof.
